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ADVERSARY REVIEW:

AN EXPERIMENT IN

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
JAKE DEAR*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Chief Justice Burger and other observers of the legal profession have, in
recent years, criticized the quality of "advocacy" in United States courts.,
While such criticism is most often directed at trial representation, 2 focus on
the performance of defense attorneys in plea negotiations is apposite to
meaningful analysis of legal representation.
No studies have specifically dealt with policing the performance of
counsel within the plea bargaining system. Moreover, one prominent critic
of plea bargain justice, Professor Albert W. Alschuler, seems to dismiss the
policing problem as being unresolvable. 3 While Professor Alschuler's conclusion is questionable, this article accepts his challenge that the burden
"rest[s] with the advocates of plea bargaining to propose some mechanism
that can achieve the asserted advantages of the guilty-plea process without,
at the same time, yielding [to] the abuses .... 4
In a line of cases from Powell v. Alabama5 to Argersznger v. Hamtn,6 the
Supreme Court has extended the sixth amendment right to counsel to various stages of criminal prosecutions. 7 As one observer has noted, the assistance of counsel is a defendant's most fundamental right, for it "affects his
* I am particularly grateful to Edwin M. Lemert, professor emeritus of the University of
California, Davis, Department of Sociology. I also appreciate the help of Philip Dubois, assistant professor of political science and judicial fellow, U.C.D. Department of Political Science;
Floyd Feeney, professor of law, U.C.D. School of Law; Forrest Dill, associate professor, U.C.D.
Department of Sociology; Jim Hanschu; and Joy Campbell. Participation by the California
County prosecutor deputies and staff was the instrumental factor in this project. That they
cooperated, considering the possible political implications, is testimony to their courage and
professionalism.
1. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialed Training and Certiftation of Advocates
Essential to Our System ofJustce?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973).
2. d passim. Similarly, most discussion of "effective assistance of counsel" has focused on
the trial stage. Craig, The Right to Adequate Representation in the CriminalProcess: Some Ohservations,
22 Sw. L.J. 260, 275 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Craig]; Note, The Emerging Right to Eective
Assistance of Counsel, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 542 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Emerging Right . See
generally Waltz, Inadequacy of TrialDefense Representationas a GroundforPost-Conviction Reliefin Crminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Waltz].
3. "The problem of providing effective representation within the framework of the guiltyplea system is a problem that cannot be resolved satisfactorily." Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1313 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Defense Attorney's
Role]. See also Alschuler, The TrialJudge'sRole In Plea BargainhingPart!, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059
(1976); Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV.
1 (1975); Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Prosecutor's Role].
4. Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 3, at 1313.
5. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6. 407 U.S. 25 (1973),
7. Eg., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Contra, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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ability to assert any other rights he may have." 8 In this vein, the Court
stated in McMann v. Richardson9 that the right to counsel contemplates the
"effective assistance of competent counsel" and that "if the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be
left to the mercies of incompetent counsel."' 10
The central importance of the defense attorney in our criminal justice
system is based on the assumption that "the process is an adversary one in
which the initiative in invoking relevant rules rests primarily on the parties
concerned ....
,I" Moreover, "[t]he defense lawyer.is not only a principal
conceptual element of. . . [the] adversary system; he is also a sine qua non of
the system's implementation."' 12 Thus, while the system is legitimized by the
presumed presence and assistance of counsel, 13 it would seem that
"[i]ncompetent counsel can thoroughly vitiate the right which his presence is
meant to secure." 14 Some mechanism for quality control within the criminal justice system is imperative, but the traditional safeguards-appellate
review and professional self-regulation-thus far have proven unable to provide that control.15
While the appellate courts differ with respect to the standard of review
applicable in challenges based on counsel's effectiveness, use of either the
"farce ' ' 16 or the various "normal competency" 17 tests frequently amounts to
little more than application of the anachronistic "fundamental fairness" doc8. Schaefer, Federahm and State CriminalProcedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956).
9. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
10. Id at 771.
II. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 172 (1968).
12. Craig, supra note 2, at 261.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227, 233, 236, 238 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466, 469-71, 480-81 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487, 490
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 329, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 6869 (1932). See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION

141 (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL

JUSTICE 10-11 (1963).
14. Fitzhugh, Prooding Efective Assistance: The Duty of Defense Counsel, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L.
123, 125 (1975-76).
15. Eg., Bazelon, The Defectwe Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Defectve Assistance]; Kavanaugh, Performance Evaluation, Education, and Testing: Alternatives to Punishment in ProfessionalRegulation, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 953, 956 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Kavanaugh]; Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is it Self Regulation?, 1974 LAW FORUM 193, 196, 228 [hereinafter cited as Marks & Cathcart]; Burbank &
Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 66, 69
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Burbank & Duboff]; Note, Inefctve Representation as a Basisfor Rehief
from Conviction. PrmncplesforAppellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Inejective Representation]. But see Note, Identifying and Remedying Inefective Assistance of
Criminal Defense Counsel- A New Look After United States v. DeCoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752
(1980); Outcaulh & Peterson, Lawyer Dsciphne and ProfessionalStandards in California: Progress and
Problems, 24 Hastings L.J. 675, 683 (1973).
16. The "farce" tests are based on the view that the sixth amendment requires nothing
more than the formal appointment of competent counsel. Subsequent analysis of counsel's performance under these tests is against the less stringent fifth amendment guarantee of due process. Thus, a petitioner may gain relief under the farce test "only when the trial was a farce, or a
mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court, or the purported
representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense." Gillihan v. Madrid
Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977). See also United
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trine.t 8 This is apparent in the tendency of numerous courts to embrace,
overtly or covertly, harmless error tests in effectiveness claims. '9 The continued reliance of appeals courts on such tests, as well as on other forms of
disingenuous legal craftsmanship, 20 together with the Supreme Court's reStates v. Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125 (lst Cir. 1976); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
17. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the Supreme Court enunciated a
standard of effective counsel within the context of plea bargaining. The Court sought to determine the point at which a defense lawyer's performance is so ineffective as to render his client's
plea an unintelligent act, and held that counsel's performance had reached this stage when his
advice to enter a guilty plea fell outside "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases." Id at 771. Nine of the federal circuit courts of appeal have rejected the farce
test (discussed at note 16 supra) in favor of variations on the "normal competency" standard.
See United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1978); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540
(4th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); Benson v. United States, 552 F.2d 223 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); Beasley v.

United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir.
July 10, 1973), option after remand, 20 CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) 2080 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976),
opinion after remand vacated en banc, March 17, 1977, rev'd, 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2365 (D.C.

Cir. July 12, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979) (placing burden of proof on defendant);
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
18. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46

(1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). "Fundamental fairness" has been rejected as
the applicable rule for other claims premised on the Bill of Rights. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 384-86 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
The fundamental fairness standard, however, remains the prevalent test in claims of ineffective
counsel. The "farce" tests evolved directly from the old doctrine. See Strazzella, Inctive Assistance of Counsel Claims- New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARiz. L. REV. 443, 446-52 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Strazzella]; Waltz, supra note 2, at 305; Note, Emerging Right, supra note 2; Note, Standards
for Determining Efective Assistance of Counsel, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 927, 934-35 (1976). Though courts
purport to apply a more objective test under the various "normal competency" standards, "the
ultimate question [under either test] is whether the defendant received a 'fair trial.' " Comment, Ineffectiveness Of Counsel-The Duty To Make A Reasonable Pretrial Investigation, 40 Mo. L.
REV. 369, 371 (1975) (footnote omitted). See Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir.
1979); Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1336 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011
(1975); Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon &Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811, 820-21 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Realities]; lnefective Representation, note 15 supra, at 37-48.
19. Invoking the rationale of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), ineffectiveness claims require a determination by the court as to whether the defendant was prejudiced by
denial of effective assistance of counsel. Compare this with the formula enunciated in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), in which the Court stated that some Bill of Rights guarantees
"might be lost, and justice still be done." 302 U.S. at 325. Such an analysis shifts the focus of
the sixth amendment claim to a fifth amendment due process issue of overall fairness and in the
process conditions the sixth amendment right on the reviewing court's subjective interpretation
of the defendant's culpability.
Citing the inapplicability of harmless error tests in counsel claims, the court in Beasley v.
United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696-97 (6th Cir. 1974), rejected its use. See also Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977) (ruling on prejudice issue revden banc in 586 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979)); but see Judge Hufstedler concurring and dissenting, 586 F.2d at 1334-42.
Still, numerous courts continue to sanction harmless error analysis in counsel claims. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214, 1221-23 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cooper, 580 F.2d
259, 263 n.8 (7th Cir. 1978); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion after remand, 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA)
2080 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), opiion after remand vacated en banc, March 17, 1977, rev'd, 25 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2365 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979) (placing burden
of proof on defendant); United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115-16 (3d Cir.
1970). See also United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1123 (Ist Cir. 1978) (leaving issue open).
20. Courts have proven willing to indulge in questionable legal gymnastics in order to
avoid the consequences of forthright analysis of counsel claims. Because Chapman v. Califor-
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luctance to enunciate a standard for counsel effectiveness, 2 1 testifies to the
inappropriateness of appellate review as a means of policing attorneys' dayto-day performance. Because of the closed nature of plea bargaining, courts
are rarely in a position to observe counsel's performance except in the most
superficial sense, usually at the plea-taking stage. 22 Moreover, the Supreme
nia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), distinguishes the right to counsel as a right the denial of which requires
automatic reversal, id at 23 n.8, those who urge use of harmless error tests for effectiveness
challenges indulge in the proposition that the right to ective assistance of counsel does not inhere in the right to counsel. "Important as it may be, the right to effective representation is not
as fundamental as the right to counsel. The right to effective representation is a gloss on the
right to counsel, but it is only a gloss." Ine ective Representation, supra note 15, at 76. See also
McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir. 1974). But see McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) rev'den bane
in 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), see Judge Hufstedler concurring and dissenting, 586 F.2d at
1334-42. See generally Note, Substantve and ProceduralAspects of the Right to 4ffectite Assistance of
Counsel, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 525, 539-43 (1979).
While the above fiction has recently evolved as a device for insuring finality of convictions
under the purported "more liberal" normal competency tests, courts have for years manipulated
the "state action" doctrine to affirm convictions in private counsel cases. This approach, using a
narrow view of the fourteenth amendment, finds necessary state action only in cases in which
counsel was assigned by the court or when state officials failed "to accord justice" to defendants
with retained counsel. Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 P.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975). See discussions of state action with respect to counsel claims in:
Finer, Inefctive ,4ssistanceof Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1077, 1113-15 (1973); Fitzhugh, supra
note 14, at 145-51; Waltz, supra note 2, at 296-301; Ineffcttve Representation, supra note 15, at 5371. Though other circuits have recently failed to apply the state action approach, Greenfield v.
Gunn, 556 F.2d 935 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928 (1977); United States ex rel. Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975), the Fifth Circuit continues to employ the state action formula, see Marino v. United States, 600 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.
1979); Perez v. Wainwright, 594 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court declined to rule
on the Fifth Circuit's double standard in Mansfield v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir.) (unpublished opinion No. 77-2517 Feb. 9, 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978). Regarding the denial
of certiorari in Mansfield, see Mr. Justice White dissenting in the denial of certiorari in Brown
Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 301, 241 S.E.2d 15 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1014,
1017-18 (1978).
21. "[T]he Supreme Court . . . has never enunciated any clear standards for courts to
follow in passing on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, circuit courts, left
without guidance, have groped for the correct prescription to apply." McQueen v. Swenson,
498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974). The High Court has "eschewed its responsibility to the lower
courts," preferring to "address the problem by persuasion and admonition." Tague, The Attempt
to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 109, 110-12 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Tague]. Recently dissenting in the denial of certiorari in Marzullo v. Maryland, 561
F.2d 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978), Mr. Justice White wrote that "[iln refusing
to review a case which so clearly frames an issue that has divided the Courts of Appeals, the
Court shirks its central responsibility as the court of last resort." 345 U.S. at 10 12-13. See also
Mr. Justice White's dissent in the denial of certiorari in Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 144
Ga. App. 301, 241 S.E.2d 15 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1014, 1017-18 (1978). In addition to
Marzullo, the High Court has denied certiorari in leading effectiveness cases of the circuit courts.
Eg., the Court refused to rule on the farce test, Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977); Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977); Dinker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1003 (1975); the confusing standard of United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); and the normal competency test, United States ex rel.
Davis v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 335 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974); Benson v. United
States, 552 F.2d 223 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977). Indeed, for petitioners seeking
relief on ineffective counsel grounds, it is a long, long way to certiorari.
22. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion afler remand
20 CRIM. L. RE'. (BNA) 2080 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), opinion afler remand vacated en bane,
March 17, 1977, rev'd, 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2365 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 302 (1979); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 739 (3d Cir. 1970); Defense Attorney' Role,
supra note 3, at 1198, 1270; Defective Assistance, supra note 15, at 34; Craig, supra note 2, at 276;
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Court's "quest for finality" 23 of guilty pleas is in direct conflict with the
long-standing assumption that positive reformation of defense performance
can be induced through reversals of convictions. 24 Further exacerbating the
situation are the Court's recent rulings constricting access to collateral review, resulting in almost complete insulation of guilty pleas and some trial
25
convictions.
The legal profession's efforts at self-regulation have proven equally unproductive as a means of monitoring criminal defense lawyers' performances.
The organized bar traditionally has preferred to deal with the problem of
26
unethical practices while ignoring the issue of professional competence.
Moreover, professional grievance procedures are geared to ascertaining the
culpability of practitioners. 27 This preoccupation with fault can be said to
limit, if not preclude, responsible criticism and corrective action by professional peers. 28 The result is that "the careless, ill-prepared, or ignorant atNote, Post-Conviction Rehef From Pleas of Gudty: A DinishingRight, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 182,
185-86 (1971); Note, Plea Bargainingand the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 564, 579 (1977). Trial judges are expected to preside over entry of the plea and ensure the
voluntariness of the bargain. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Judicial participation in
plea negotiations is, however, officially condemned. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL
JUDGE § 4.1(2) (1974); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 136 (1967). Thus, the trial
judge's ability to spot problems in defense counsel's preparation, especially in the plea bargaining context, is suspect; even when problems are obvious, the court may refuse to acknowledge
them. See Katz, Gideons Trumpet." Mournful and Muffed, 55 IOWA L. REV. 523, 557-58 (1970).
Even when defense counsel's inadequacies are brought to the attention of the court or occur
during trial, judges are reluctant to intervene. See United States ex rel. Spencer v. Warden,
Pontiac Correction Center, 545 F.2d 21, 22-25 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. De Coster, 487
F.2d 1197, 2000 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion after remand, 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2080 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 19, 1976), opinion after remandvacated en bane, March 17, 1977, rev'd, 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA)
2365 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979); United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d
928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that "the matter [of ensuring effective assistance of counsel] for the most part, should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). See also Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1124 (1st Cir. 1978);
Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1977); Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334,
1337 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975).
23. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); id at 83-84 (Powell, J., concurring);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 787 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Erickson, The Fiality of a Gudty Plea, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 835, 835-37, 845, 846 n.80, 848-49 (1973).
24. The "reformation through reversal" view is espoused by Realities, supra note 18, at 822
n.51. The prophylactic effect of reversal is questioned by Tague, supra note 21, at 165.
25. Eg., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976);
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771-73 (1970). See
generally Strazzella, supra note 18, at 472-84; Goodman & Sallet, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower
FederalCourts Respond, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1683 (1979).
26. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 15. See Kavanaugh, supra note 15; Committee Report. The
Dispositionof Cases of ProfessionalIncompetence in the Grievance System, 32 THE RECORD 130 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Committee Report]. See generally J. CARLIN, LAWYER'S ETHICS: A STUDY OF
THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1970) [hereinafter cited as J. CARLIN]; ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (CLARK COMMITTEE) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as CLARK COMMITTEE]; Arkin, Self Regulation and Approaches to Maintaining Standardsof ProfessionalIntegrity, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 308 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Arkin]; Note, Legal Ethics
and Professionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179 (1970).
27. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 15; Kavanaugh, supra note 15.
28. Although failure to inform the regulatory "authority" of "unprivileged knowledge or
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torney who continually produces inadequate legal work is often beyond
29
effective regulation."
Despite current failings, professional self-regulation may have great potential, especially in the criminal justice system. The goal of this article is to
articulate a concept of adversary review. No specific proposals are made;
rather, a critical discussion of the efficacy and potential of one adversary
review system is presented to offer a method and preliminary documentation
for further study of the problem of implementing effective professional selfregulation.
It should be noted that the assumption that self-regulation by criminal
justice system lawyers will be meaningful is based on the presumption that
individual attorneys would subvert their own desires to win, thereby making
the integrity of the system paramount. This presumption would result, for
example, in a prosecutor telling his opponent that the defense attorney had
performed poorly, even when the prosecutor knew such remarks would result
in an ongoing adversary improving his performance, and possibly winning
the next case. Some of the comments made by individual prosecutors participating in the study described below may indicate, however, that subverting
the desire for convictions is, under the present system, extremely difficult for
30
some assistant district attorneys.
II.

METHOD

The research for this study was performed in a California county, referred to in this article as California County. 3 1 The entire staff3 2 of the
county district attorney's office evaluated the performance of defense attorneys in criminal cases, with particular emphasis on performance in plea bargaining. The study did not attempt full peer review. While deputy
prosecutors evaluated defense counsel, there was no review of the prosecutors
evidence concerning [the incompetency of] another lawyer or judge" is a disciplinable offense
under the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-102(A), -103(A), (B) (1975),
the Code has been ineffective in coercing reports. Committee Report, supra note 26, at 130, 132
n.9, 133 (1977). See Brown, A.B.A. Code of ProfessionalResponsibih'to:
In Defense of Mediocnto, 16
CATH. LAW. 314 (1970); Note, The Lawyer's Duy to Report Arofessional Misconduct, 20 ARIZ. L.
REV. 509 (1978). In an analysis of complaints filed against California attorneys between 196970 only 37, or about 0.1% of California's 30,672 attorneys, were disciplined or recommended to
be disciplined. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 15, at 214-15. Study of the New York Bar disclosed that only 2% of allviolators were processed through the bar's regulatory scheme, and that
less than 0.2% of all violators were actually sanctioned by either disbarment, censure, or suspension. J. CARLIN, supra note 26, at 170. Nationwide, less than 0.1% of practicing attorneys face
official sanction of any kind from the organized bar, according to the ABA Center for Professional Discipline located in Chicago, Illinois. Due to the bar's traditional disinclination to act
without specific complaint, see CLARK COMMIrrEE, supra note 26 at 60-66; Burbank & Duboff,
supra note 15, at 100-01, this situation is not likely to change in the near future.
29. Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at 960.
30. See note 49 and accompanying text inha.
31. "California County" is a pseudonym. The author preferred not to identify the county
studied. The county is a large rural county with an approximate population of 100,000 to
200,000. In the year of the survey, the county's District Attorney's office filed approximately
1,300 complaints.
32. The legal experience of the staff is set out in Appendix ii.
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by defense attorneys. The method is, therefore, described as "one-sided adversary review."
A.

The Research Design

A significant impediment to performance-oriented research is the bar's
traditional disinclination to engage in critical evaluation at the level of particulars. While most practitioners are willing or even anxious to condemn
incompetency generally, few are inclined to support such statements with
specific criticism. This ubiquitous difficulty was stressed in the Clark Report:
Although lawyers and judges have the necessary background to
evaluate the conduct of attorneys and are far better equipped than
laymen to recognize violations of professional standards, relatively
few complaints are submitted to disciplinary agencies by members
of the profession. This fact has been cited as a major problem by
agency in the United States surveyed by
nearly every disciplinary
33
this Committee.
The result, as noted by Judge David J. Bazelon of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, is that "[tihere are no statistics to
illustrate the scope of the problem [of ineffective assistance] because . . the
34
criminal justice system goes to considerable lengths to bury the problem."
This project was designed to collect data to fill this void. The prosecutor's staff agreed to participate in a small-scale experiment in performance
evaluation. For twelve weeks, the deputy district attorneys evaluated opposing counsel's performance in plea bargaining. To facilitate this evaluation, a
one-page form was designed, in cooperation with the assistant district attorneys, 35 which enabled each deputy to evaluate the performance of defense
counsel with minimal demands on prosecutor time. 36 The form is primarily
a device for estimating counsel's preparation,and so is particularly appropriate for analyzing plea bargain results, since it focuses on the most identifiable aspect of defense counsel's work. Counsel's duty to investigate,
regardless of the accused's stated desire to plead guilty is clearly mandated in
the A.B.A. Standards.37 Increasingly, appellate courts look to these standards
as "a starting point for the court to develop, on a case-by-case basis, clearer
38
guidelines for courts and lawyers as to the meaning of effective assistance."
Focus on the requirement of investigation is further emphasized by the ABA
33. CLARK COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 167.
34. Defeciwe Assistance, supra note 15, at 2.
35. Regarding survey-form research, Cicourel has noted that:
[tlhe problem is not that organizational categories, questions, and answers are irrelevant, but that surveys and official records typically structure materials, so that the
answer is decided by the form in which the question is posed or formal categories
provided for classification. What is lacking is the actor's conception of the operative
social structures.
A. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 107 (1968). Involvement of
the deputies in construction of the survey form was an attempt to minimize this problem.
36. The deputies cited lack of time as the major technical problem of the survey.
37. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 13, § 4.1.

38. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 n.23, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion afler
remand, 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2080 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), opinion after remand vacated en
bant, March 17, 1977, rev'd, 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2365 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979), cer. denied,

100 S. Ct. 302 (1979); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968); Tague, supra note 21,
at 127 n.104.
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OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
which provides that the
"[h]andl[ing of a] legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances" is a disciplinable offense. 39 The idea that preparation can be defined and measured is asserted in the Third Circuit's observation that "[t]he
advocate's work. . . is not readily capable of later audit like a bookkeeper's.
Of course, not all the activity of the advocate has this highly subjective quality. It is possible to examine the sufficiency of his preparation and the ade40
quacy of his knowledge of the relevant law."
CODE

B.

The Survey Form

On the survey form, 4 1 the deputies could indicate five control characteristics of each case, and, where applicable, evaluate defense counsel's performance with respect to final disposition. In order to make comparisons
without risking participants' anonymity, a coding system to identify deputies
and defense counsel was developed. Identification numbers were randomly
assigned to the seven deputies and approximately seventy-five defense lawyers. Using the code, each deputy answered questions number one and two
by indicating the proper code numbers for himself and opposing counsel.
The third question indicated defense counsel status: public defender,
appointed, or privately retained. Next, the main charge was indicated. In
an effort to minimize the reporting burden, four classifications of charges
were chosen:42 (1) selected misdemeanors (drunk driving cases), (2) serious
misdemeanors (alternate felony/misdemeanor cases), (3) felonies (all felonies
except those categorized as serious felonies), and (4) serious felonies (various
violent offenses). Finally, the case status was indicated: in negotiation,
charges dropped, and agreement on a guilty plea. Since the deputies were
instructed to fill out forms whenever a "meaningful attempt at negotiation"
occurred, almost half of the returns were reported as "still in negotiation."
While these particular reports are of limited value for this analysis, the "in
negotiation" category encouraged the deputies to examine the preparation
of counsel on a daily basis.
The five control questions were followed by three judgmental questions.
First, the deputies were asked to give a general qualitative rating of defense
counsel's preparation; and, in instances where preparation was judged to be
inadequate, the deputies were asked to indicate whether defense counsel was
informed of the problem. Next, the deputies indicated specific problem
areas for cases in which inadequate preparation had been found. Finally,
the influence of counsel's preparation on the disposition of the case was reported. As an optional step deputies were asked to comment.
Over the twelve-week survey period, 618 completed forms were returned, 348 of which reported dispositions. The prosecutors filled out forms
in 90 to 95% of the applicable cases. After the survey, the prosecutors were
39.
40.
41.
42.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 6-101(A)(2) (1975).
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970).
See Appendix i.
See Appendix iii. The deputies participated in these selections. See note 35 supra.
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asked to complete an open-ended self-evaluation designed to shed light on
43
the credibility and objectivity of their evaluations.
C.

Characlerisli'sof Caiforni'a Couno

The issue of effective assistance of counsel is especially germane to California County, because of the heavy use of charge-reduction plea bargaining
by the office of the district attorney. This tactic is pursued by initially
overcharging defendants. As one prosecutor stated in an interview:
I'll charge everything within reason. There are other charges we
could still dream up, but. . . we still employ a "shotgun" charging
system. We do this for two reasons: One, if we're pressed to go to
trial, we want to go in with all the possible charges, because you
never know what a jury will find on. Two, [shotgun charging] fathe negotiation process. It gives you something to move
cilitates
44
on.
Overcharging is facilitated by CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4). 45 One
prosecutor stated in an interview that section 17(b)(4) "almost encourages
charge reduction bargaining" by specifically allowing some charges to be
filed as either felonies or misdemeanors. If the same crime can be considered
either a felony or a misdemeanor, with jail or prison alternate sentences, the
charge is considered a "wobbler" under section 17(b)(4). The case can be
filed at either level in the deputy district attorney's discretion. The practice
is to charge at the felony level and drop to a misdemeanor to facilitate bargaining.
Another means of expediting the bargaining process is provided in the
liberal definition of "reasonably related" enunciated in People V. Wet. 46 Under West, defendants are allowed to enter guilty pleas to a "reasonably related" offense carrying a mutually acceptable sentence or sanction.
The extensive use of charge-reduction bargaining in California County
becomes statistically evident when the county's felony arrest attrition rate is
compared with that of other counties in California. In the year in which this
study took place, only 22% of felony arrests in California County received a
felony disposition. This is comparable to a state-wide felony arrest/felony
disposition rate of 23%. But, in California County, 73% of felony arrestees
received dispositions at the misdemeanor level, in comparison to 57% statewide. At the screening stages, California County law enforcement agencies
showed a low release rate of .55% compared to 6.7% statewide. Also, for the
same period, the California County District Attorney's Office denied only
5.1% of all felony complaints, as opposed to 13.6% statewide. Despite apparent low levels of screening, the county maintained a conviction rate of 64%
4 7
for all felony arrests, compared to a statewide figure of 56%.
43. See Appendix ii.
44. Quoted written comments of California County prosecutors were made on the survey
forms. As indicated in the text, some comments were made during interviews.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4) (West 1979).
46. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
47. These figures are derived from data reported in the CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFILE.
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While it is possible that California County's low screening percentage is
the result of better quality arrests, this is not likely to be the case. Instead, it
appears that some defendants are deliberately charged as a result of infirm
arrests, with the intention of pushing them into the criminal justice system.
One sheriff candidly stated during an interview:
A lot of times cases are dumped because the case isn't that hot on
the officer's part . . . and they're not going to get a good conviction out of it so they bargain it out to the best they can get. . . . If
I've got a shaky case, I'll go down to the D.A.'s and say, "Hey, let's
try and work it out" . . . If I don't feel good about a case, I'll go
down to the D.A.'s and say, "Hey, if you ever use plea bargaining,
let's use it now." I mean, I don't like the plea bargaining system
• . . but there are times and places for it on weak cases.
Similarly, a police officer who was interviewed stated:
I have no problem with [the exclusionary rule] being used as a tool
[in bargaining]. A U.S. Supreme Court decision that came down
about a year ago stated that the safety of the community has to be
looked at as well as the individual's rights [with respect to] search
and seizure, and sometimes those rights should be overlooked, or
be given . . . for the safety and securvery minimal weight should
48
ity of the community.
Guilty pleas, most of which are achieved through plea bargaining, are
the primary method of obtaining convictions in California County. 49 To the
extent that such pleas result from manipulation by law enforcement officials
and from the district attorney's overcharging policy, outcomes depend heavily on defense counsel's role as a countervailing agent able to overcome the
influence of infirm arrests and inflated charges. The reality behind this dependence will now be examined.
III.

A.

ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE PERFORMANCE IN CALIFORNIA COUNTY

Correlationof Charges to Dispositions

Table 1, below, shows a breakdown of both the main charges and the
dispositions which occurred during the twelve-week period. As might be expected, the percentage of interactions 50 resulting in dispositions decreases
with severity of the charge; an apparent exception in regard to serious misdemeanors can be explained by the influence of charge-reduction bargaining
51
under CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4).

48. The officer was alluding to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). But see Lefkowitz v.
Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 296 n.3 (1975) (White, J., dissenting); Note, Plea Bargainng and the
Transfornatton ofthe CnrinalProcess, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564, 573 (1977). See generaly Prosecutor's
Role, supra note 3.
49. Guilty pleas account for approximately 95% of the criminal convictions in California
County, supra note 47.
50. "Interactions" include cases reported as "still in negotiation" and cases reported as
"disposition reached."
51. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.

411

ADVERSARY REVIEW

1980]

Table I
Status of Case by Main Charge Classification
Main Charge Classification*
Serious
Misdemeanors

Selected
Misdemeanors

Status of Case
"In Negotiation"
"Final Disposition

Felonies

Serious
Felonies

41.6%
58.4

35.6%
64.4

60.3%
39.7

63.6%
36.4

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

n=380

n= 129

n=78

n=22

Reached"

9 observations = missing
*See classifications in Appendix iii
618 total cases in survey

B.

Performance Evaluations

In response to the first of three judgmental questions of the survey form,
evaluated the overall performance of defense counsel. Table 2,
deputies
the
below, shows a breakdown of the deputies' assessments of the quality of this
performance.
Table 2
Performance Evaluations by Reporting Deputy, Disposed Cases
Deputy Nos.
Nos. 4-7*

ALL

No. I

No. 2

No. 3

28.8%
60.6
10.6

10.0%
60.0
30.0

57.3%
30.8
11.9

10.3%
67.9
21.8

33.1%
49.9
17.0

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

n=66

n=60

n= 143

n=78

n=347

Performance
Evaluations
"Excellent"
"Acceptable"
"Inadequate"

I observation = missing
*While seven deputies were involved in the survey, three handled the bulk of the plea negotiations and dispositions. Deputies 4-7 include: one administrator, two veteran trial attorneys, and
one deputy involved in work mostly outside the scope of the survey.

Analysis of Table 2 suggests that the ratings of performance vary from
deputy to deputy. Because of the distribution of the various courts in California County, a team of two prosecutors frequently deals with a corresponding team of public defenders and a handful of private counsel. Thus, the
sample from which the evaluations of performance were drawn probably
reflected differences in levels of competence of lawyers in different areas of
the county. For this reason, evaluations that deviate from the norm do not
necessarily indicate unreliability of the deputies' judgments; moreover, such
evaluations are likely to reflect the peculiar characteristics of the county.
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Analysis of data not shown indicates that while defense performances
were inadequate in 17% of dispositions, the deputies showed a marked reluctance to inform opposing counsel of perceived inadequacies, doing so in only
52
29% of the applicable cases.
Table 3
Performance Evaluations by Defense Counsel Status, Disposed Cases
Defense Counsel Status*
Public
Defender

Appointed

Retained

All Defense
Attorneys

37.2%
43.9
19.0

33.2%
49.7
17.0

Performance
Evaluations
"Excellent"

30.1%

33.3%

"Acceptable"
"Inadequate"

55.4
14.5

33.3
33.3

100.0%

99.9%

100.1%

99.9%

n=186

n= 12

n= 148

n=346

2 observations = missing
*Further analysis of data not shown reveals that "charge breakdowns" for each defense counsel
status are quite similar. For example, 67.2% of the public defenders' cases were "selected misdemeanors," compared to 67.6% for retained counsel. Additionally, 2.2% of the public defenders'
cases were "serious felonies," compared with 1.4% for retained counsel.

Table 3 indicates that public defenders were rated favorably more often
than retained counsel. Further, analysis of data not shown reveals that public defenders were more frequently informed of the perceived inadequacy
53
when their performance fell below the accepted minimum.
C.

Inadequate Preparation

In cases in which defense counsel's performance was found to be inadequate, the deputies specified the problem areas of inadequacy. The most
frequent problem was defense counsel's ignorance of case facts. Indeed, this
might have proven to be an even more pervasive problem if the "combination or all" category were broken down.
52. Analysis of data not shown reveals that this trend holds for all deputies.
53. Public defenders were informed of their inadequacies in 37% of the applicable cases, as
opposed to 27.3% for retained counsel. Further analysis of data not shown indicates that the
deputies' propensities to inform opposing counsel of inadequacies did not increase with the
severity of the charge.
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Table 4
Areas of Inadequate Preparation by Defense
Counsel Status, Disposed Cases
Defense Counsel Status
Public Defender

Appointed

Retained

Problem Area
Facts of Cases
Witnesses
Statutes
Case Law
Combo/All

41.4%
10.3
3.4
10.3
34.5

50.0%
0.0
25.0
0.0
25.0

26.7%
13.3
0.0
0.0
60.0

99.9%

100.0%

100.0%

n=29

n=4

n=30

Table 4 indicates that retained attorneys were cited as having problems
relating to witnesses and case facts in 40% of their cases, as opposed to 51%
for public defenders. While this distinction may be explained by the heavy
caseloads that public defenders carry the frequent reporting of "combination
or all" problems for retained counsel may suggest that the actual extent of
failure to fully investigate facts is greater than indicated by the percentages
in specific categories.
D.

Efect of Counsel's Performance on Case Disposiion

The last question of the form solicited from the deputies a categorization of the quality of the case disposition by applying the following seven
descriptive synopses:
1. The case was deemed "routine" by the assistant district attorney and defense counsel; there was no discussion of case particulars,
but a plea agreement was reached.
2. Defense counsel's preparation was adequate/very good, and
the defendant benefited by such representation.
3. Defense preparation was adequate, but for other reasons (such
as a personality conflict between attorneys) the disposition was not
as favorable as it might have been had the defendant been represented by other counsel.
4. Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate, but the case was
strong and (for this or other reasons unrelated to counsel's lack of
preparation) adequate preparation would have rendered the same
result.
5. Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate and would have
resulted in a less favorable disposition for the defendant, but the
D.A. compensated and granted an equitable bargain.
6. Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate and resulted in a
less than favorable disposition for the defendant.
7. Both inadequate preparation and personality conflicts (between the assistant district attorney and defense counsel) were key
factors detrimental to the defendant's disposition.
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Analysis of the data shows that defense attorneys were rated inadequately prepared in 18.6% of all dispositions. 54 Either because the state's
case was strong or the deputies compensated, counsel's inadequacies were
judged not to have affected the dispositions in 60% of these cases. But 1n 40%
of the cases in which counsel's preparationwas judged inadequate, the assistantdistrict
attorney indicated that the disposition was detrimentalfor the defendant. Thus, the

deputies reported that in 7.4% of the cases there was a result that Judge
Bazelon has characterized as "shocking": "the prosecutor was perfectly willing to let the defendant be victimized by his lawyer's inadequacy. '55 Further, analysis of data not shown indicates that, in 17.6% of the cases in which
defense counsel was told of his perceived inadequacy, the defendant still received a detrimental disposition. Conversely, in 45.2% of the cases in which
defense lawyers were not informed of perceived inadequacies, deputies either
compensated for counsel's performance or otherwise rationalized the disposition in such a way that counsel's failings did not penalize the defendant.
5
Analysis of the quality of dispositions by defense attorney status

6

shows, that for the three classifications, there is marked deviation in the incidences of routine dispositions. As might be predicted, 42% of the public defender's cases were labeled routine, as opposed to 8 and 26.4% for appointed
and retained counsel, respectively. Removing these routine cases from the
performance oriented disposition options permits closer analysis of defense
counsel performance.
54. The slight increase in "inadequate" evaluations from the 17% figure reported in Tables
2 and 3 occurred because six cases originally labeled as "acceptable" were deemed "inadequate"
at the disposition stage. See Table 5, infra.
55. Defective Assistance, supra note 15, at 15. Judge Bazelon adds that prosecutors have little
incentive to do otherwise, as there is no serious threat of reversal on ineffective counsel grounds.
With respect to the prosecutor's willingness to "let the defendant be victimized," one deputy maintained that "fatal flaws," (i.e., violations of exclusionary rules) are "screened out," and
do not contribute significantly to dispositions. On the other hand, the same deputy stated that
he "feel[s] no duty to tell [counsel] about ... legal and evidentiary problems. . .[and] flaws in
the case which don't justify a dismissal or rejection of the charge at the outset." The deputy
related two cases to illustrate the point:
I had a "wobbler." [See note 45 supra]. [Defense attorney] called up and said his client
was ready to plead. When he arrived, he had the plea forms all filled out and signed
by his client. He had his man pleading to a felony! Of course, I was expecting to
settle a misdemeanor, but I didn't say anything. I just signed ...
(A highly respected defense attorney] failed to notice a fantastic flaw in our evidence.
He just didn't see it. His client is in prison now. Even the best make mistakes.
A second deputy recalled a similar case:
There were three people being arraigned. One of them was represented by [a public
defender]. The charges against his client were really weak; they were felony bad
checks, but we couldn't have proven it. The checks were three years old, and we
didn't have the key witness. The defendant wanted to plead guilty, but the judge had
assigned her [a public defender]. When she told [the public defender] she wanted to
plead as charged, he said "OK" and filled out the forms. He didn't even attempt to
negotiate. That's incompetence. It's also unethical . . .but, if I have a car worth
$375, and somebody offers me $500, I'll take it. And I took the felony. ...
Another incident related by the second deputy involved an inexperienced attorney:
I was sitting there with the defense, waiting for the judge. [Counsel] leaned over tome
and asked, "Hey, what should I do? Plead guilty now, or ask for a continuance?" I
told him it was his decision. He then asked "what should I plead this guy guilty to?" I
told him to P.A.C. [plead as charged] and he did.
56. See note at Table 3, supra.
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Table 5
Quality of Performance and Outcome of Non-Routine
Dispositions by Defense Counsel Status
Defense Counsel Status
Public Defender

Appointed

Retained

71.3%

63.6%

70.7%

Adequate/But Detrimental
Inadequate/But Favorable;
Case Was Strong

1.9

0.0

0.0

12.0

18.2

9.2

Inadequate/But Favorable;
Deputy Compensated

5.5

0.0

7.3

Inadequate/Detrimental
Outcome

9.3

18.2

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

n=108

n=1 1

n=109

Quality of Performance/Outcome
Adequate, Very Good/
Favorable

12.8

In cases in which counsel's performance was indicated as instrumental
to the disposition, the deputies rated preparation as inadequate in 28% of the
cases. Public defenders were found to be inadequately prepared in 27% of
their cases, but contributed to detrimental dispositions in only 26% of those
cases. Retained attorneys were rated as inadequately prepared in 29% of
indicated to have adtheir cases, and their inadequate preparation was
57
versely affected dispositions in 41% of those cases.
58
Though these categorical analyses are interesting, such generalized
analysis is of limited use for the purpose of singling out individual attorneys
for closer study. Using other survey data, however, it is possible to analyze
individual counsel's performance while controlling for key variables. For example, one defense lawyer, a deputy public defender, handled thirty-eight
dispositions over the twelve-week period. Of these, thirty were selected misdemeanors, five were serious misdemeanors, two were felonies, and one was a
serious felony. The deputy public defender was rated inadequate in 31.6% of
the cases, and was informed of the perceived inadequacies only 25% of the
time. No single problem area stands out; the assistant district attorneys cited
"combination or all" to describe 75% of the deputy public defender's problem cases. Of his thirty-eight dispositions, 52% were labeled routine. In his

57. Analysis of data not shown reveals that "personality conflicts" contributed to five of
retained counsel's "detrimental outcomes." No such conflicts were reported for public defenders or appointed counsel.
58. Superficially, these findings challenge the prevailing assumption that public defenders
render inferior service in comparison to retained counsel. While Table 5 can be interpreted in
this way, such a conclusion is unfounded. Analysis of data not shown reveals little deviation
within quality ratings of public defenders; retained counsel, however, are shown to perform at
highly variant levels of competence. As one deputy prosecutor explained, "public defenders are
mediocre most of the time. On the other hand, some retained counsel are excellent and others
"
are horrible ....
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nonroutine dispositions, assistant district attorneys indicated that the deputy
defender rendered acceptable performance and contributed to favorable dispositions in 22%. He was rated inadequately prepared in the remaining 78%
of nonroutine dispositions, yielding detrimental dispositions in 35% of these
cases. One deputy who regularly dealt with this attorney wrote:
Defense counsel attempted to enter [a] written guilty plea but after
two attempts had to be instructed by judge on proper method
. . . . Defendant in custody, and lack of preparation prevented
timely hearing of the case . . . . Total lack of familiarity with the
facts of [the] case or applicable legal expectations . . . . Defense
counsel was unaware of effect of plea on defendant's other cases
. . . . The only witness is dead but defense counsel had defendant
plead guilty anyway . . . . Lack of client control . . . . No client
contact . . . . Poor client control . . . . Lack of preparation ....
Lack of familiarity with the case ....
In contrast, another attorney handled ten dispositions during the survey
period, appearing as retained counsel in nine, and as court-appointed in the
other. Five of his cases were selected misdemeanors, two were serious misdemeanors, and three were felonies. His performance was rated excellent in
nine cases and acceptable in one; no problems were reported. Of his ten
dispositions, one was labeled routine, and nine were categorized as adequate/very good, the highest rating listed. 59
IV.

INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

The findings indicate that a defense lawyer's personality and performance history affect his interaction with the deputy prosecutor and are, thus, a
major factor in the ultimate quality of the criminal case disposition. 60 In
plea bargaining, prosecutors weigh the strengths, weaknesses, and inadequacies of defense lawyers in their decisions to grant reductions in charge or
sentence. This is borne out by the comments made during interviews with
several deputy district attorneys:
You try to divorce yourself from what personal feelings you might
have about an attorney. But we're human. When he comes
around here, I listen to him, but maybe not as long as I would
listen to other attorneys. I don't want to say it hurts his clients, but
6
it doesn't help them. '
59. These two examples reflect extremes; see note 58 supra.
60. Previous quantitative research on plea bargaining has not penetrated the bargaining
process and has tended to present an incomplete picture of outcome factors. ie., in J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS
(1977), the authors offer a sophisticated analysis of the relation of length of sentence to selected
characteristics, but were unable to control for the identity of individual defense counsels. Summarizing their data, the authors concluded that "all of the variables commonly thought to be
significant in affecting the length of sentence account for only one-half to two-thirds of the
variance. The effects of the queuing, measurement error, and random or unidentified factors
account for the rest." Id. at 285. Such a conclusion seems ill considered. The exisiting plethora
of quantitative research relating to plea bargaining and the defense attorney's role in that process hardly merit defense counsel's designation as an "unidentified factor" affecting the length of
sentence. Indeed, it can be argued that defense counsel is the major determining factor in case
outcomes.
61. Regarding the same attorney, other deputies revealed:
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When [defense counsel] comes in here and threatens to go to trial, I
laugh inside. He'll never let it go to trial. I know it, he knows it,
everybody knows it. It's an empty threat. Now, if [another defense
counsel] comes in here and says "we'll go," then it means something. I respect his trial ability. Empty threats do nothing to me
Last week, [a private attorney] went up against [a deputy] in trial,
and lost really bad. This week, he went back to [the same deputy]
on a new case and pleaded right away. Then he came to me on
another case. I told him, "well, I've got an open calendar next
week, I'll just take it to trial . . . ." He pled out right here.
Counsel's actual performance in a particular case also determines the
nature of the ultimate disposition of that case, to either the advantage or
detriment of the defendant. Commenting on specific cases, the deputies'
written observations illustrate the influence of counsel:
Investigation into facts by defense counsel resulted in misdemeanor
disposition on felony charge.
Counsel proposed use of a little known statute for guilty plea and it
was to defendant's advantage.
Defense counsel was on top of all of the defendant's pending cases
and was able to work out a disposition covering all cases.
Defense counsel made a point of examining the physical evidence
prior to pre-trial.
Counsel arrived late, did not pre-try, set case for trial that should
have been negotiated, and did not check into reliability of witnesses.
Counsel failed to negotiate the case. . . [and] her client pleaded as
charged when I was willing to negotiate to a lesser charge.
Counsel would not talk to me . . . result: one year in jail rather
than in alcohol program.
Counsel didn't take time to deal with the case.
Counsel didn't do anything.
Counsel is continually unprepared factually and legally.
Defendant could gain [the] benefit of dismissal under applicable
law but counsel refused to use that avenue, insisting on a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea which was denied, leaving conviction on
record.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM

Peer review, though a seemingly radical challenge to the prevailing concept of self-regulation, is not as alien as it first might appear. An informal
system of assessment clearly operates on a daily basis in attorney interactions. 62 Furthermore, intra-professional evaluation is presently utilized in
When [a lawyer in private practice who was retained] has a case, you never hear the
end of it. He'll rant and rave and cry and whine and just make you sick. Maybe he
thinks he gets good deals with his clients, but not from me . . ..
When he calls, I just turn him off. He'll go through this b.s. story and cry all over me.
His tactic-is "bug you till you crack." I'm immune to it.
62. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 15, at 204-05.
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both large law firms and in non-legal professions. 63 If employed constructively, absent the fault and sanction-dominated machinery of grievance
boards, a peer review system could be a step toward actualizing the legal
64
profession's claim that it regulates itself.
Such a move is both desirable and practical. The need for some peer
review is mandated by the current system's failure to effectively come to
grips with the problem of inadequate performance. 65 Clearly, the possibility
of meaningful peer review, especially in the context of plea bargaining in
which attorneys operate almost exclusively in seclusion, is real. The major
obstacle lies in convincing the bar that peer review need not take on the
customary negative trappings of grievance procedures, but can be performed
in a closed professional atmosphere emphasizing constructive criticism to fa66
cilitate attorneys' improvement.
Whether a survey similar to the one that is the topic of this article
would be feasible without initial "grassroots" support of lawyers is doubtful;
indeed, monitoring and prodding the flow of reports in this small-scale survey proved to be its most difficult feature, calling for both a high level of
diplomacy and continuing management. Still, a large-scale survey is required to fully test the method of adversary review outlined in this article.
To this end, improvements and modifications of the method must be made.
For example, a large-scale survey should be open, instead of secretive. Moreover, an overt program could utilize administrative procedures to insure con67
sistent reporting.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Given the continued reliance on plea bargaining in the criminal justice
system, its low visibility, and the crucial importance of the defense attorney's
role, some means of performance review is mandatory if justice is to be approximated. This could be accomplished by (a) a redefinition or liberalization of appellate policy, (b) incremental procedural adjustments of the plea
bargaining system, or (c) a system of adversary review applied in a constructive, professional fashion. This article proposes 6 8 that adversary review is
feasible and may serve as a means of effective quality control in the criminal
justice system.
63. See Wolkin, More on a Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 1064, 1065
(1975) [hereinafter cited as More on a Better Way]; Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at 977.
64. See Wolkin, A Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 574 (1975); More on a
Better Way, supra note 63; Marks & Cathcart, supra note 15, at 203; Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at
978; Arkin, supra note 26.
65. See notes 15-28 and accompanying text supra.
66. It is suggested that grievance committees should be involved in matters of alleged professional incompetence only after the attorney in question displays a chronic inability or reluctance to respond to constructive suggestions of a closed peer review organization. See More on a
Better Way, supra note 63, at 1064-65.
67. As many deputies suggested, placing an evaluation form in each case file would facilitate reporting.
68. Here, the wisdom of Judge Bazelon is appropriate: "[Biranding a problem insoluble to
avoid facing it, or a solution utopian to avoid trying it, turns doubts into self-fulfilling prophecies." Defectte Assistance, supra note 15, at 23.
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Appendix i
Defense Counsel Preparation Survey
(l)

Deputy DA Id.

(2)

Defense Counsel Id

(3)

Defense Counsel Status
Retained.

(1)

Math Charge.- "1" = selected misdemeanors, "2" = "serious" misdemeanors,
"3' = felonies, "4" = "serious" felonies.

(5)

Case Status: "1" = in negotiation, "2" = continuing negotiation-this case
was reported previously, "3" = disposition reached, charges dropped
or suspended, "4" = disposition reached, agreement on guilty plea,
"5" = (other)

(6)

Deputy Analysis ofDefense Preparaton. "I" = excellent, "2" = acceptable, "3"
- inadequate, and the "problem"
was brought to the attention of
defense counsel, "4" = inadequate, and defense counsel was not
informed.

(7)

Rroblem Area. (BLANK = no problem), "I" = inadequate investigation of
the facts, "2" = inadequate researching of witnesses, testimony, etc.,
"3" = inadequate researching of statutes, "4" = inadequate
researching of case law, "5" = combination or all of the above.

(8)

Resulting Disposition" (BLANK = no disposition) IF A DISPOSITION WAS
REACHED, OR IS ALMOST ASSURED, WHICH SYNOPSIS
BEST DESCRIBES THE END?

"1"

Public Defender, "2" = Appointed, "3" =

1.

Routine:

II.

"I" = The case was deemed "routine" by DA and defense counsel; there
was no discussion of case particulars, but a plea agreement was
reached.
Adequate Preparation Found:

III.

"2" = Defense counsel's preparation was adequate/very good, and the
defendant benefited by such representation.
"3" = Defense preparation was adequate, but for other reasons (such as
a personality conflict between attorneys) the disposition was not as
favorable as it might have been had the defendant been
represented by other counsel.
Inadequate Preparation Found:
"4"

= Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate, but the case was
strong and (for this or other reasons unrelated to counsel's lack of
preparation) adequate preparation would have rendered the same
result.
"Y' = Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate and would have
resulted in a less favorable disposition for the defendant, but the
DA compensated and granted an equitable bargain.
"6" = Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate; this resulted in a
less than favorable disposition for the defendant.
"7" = Both inadequate preparation and personality conflicts (between
DA and Defense counsel) were key factors detrimental to the
defendant's disposition.
(9) Comment i/desired The thing that struck me most about defense counsel's performance was
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ADVERSARY REVIEW
Appendix zi
Charge Categories

Selected misdemeanors (drunk driving charges)
Serious misdemeanors
a) Alternative felony/misdemeanors (wobblers) filed as
misdemeanors pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4) (West 1979) and
disposed of as such
b) Cases filed as felonies but disposed as misdemeanors pursuant to
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(5) (West 1979).
3. Felonies
All cases disposed of on a felony basis except those falling in the
category of serious felonies
4. Serious felonies
a) Murder and included offenses
b) Robbery
c) Rape
d) Forcible sodomy and oral copulation
e) First degree burglary
f) Any felony in which use of a firearm is alleged and proved as an
enhancement
g) Any felony in which infliction of great bodily injury is alleged and
proved as an enhancement
h) Any felony in which excessive taking is alleged and proved as an
enhancement
i) Any felony which in addition to admitting or being found guilty
of, the defendant admits or is found to have suffered a previous conviction
j) Any felony punishable by life imprisonment
k) Assault with a deadly weapon, attempted murder, assault with
intent to kill
1) Child molestation
1.
2.

